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Thirty years after the Chornobyl nuclear power plant disaster, its aftermath and consequences 
are still a permanent element of the economic, environmental and social situation of Ukraine, 
Belarus and some regions of Russia. Ukraine, to which the scope of this text is limited, expe-
rienced the most severe shock because, among other factors, the plant where the accident 
took place was located just 100 km away from Kyiv. Its consequences have affected the course 
of political developments in the country, and have become part of the newly-shaped national 
identity of independent Ukraine. The country bore the huge cost of the clean-up effort but 
did not give up on nuclear energy, and today nuclear power plants generate more than half 
of its electricity. The system of social benefits for people recognised as disaster survivors, 
which was put in place by the Soviet government, has become a huge burden on the country’s 
budget; if implemented fully, it would account for more than 10% of total public spending, 
and is therefore being implemented to only a partial extent. This system has reinforced the 
Ukrainian people’s sense of helplessness and dependence on the state. The disaster has also 
become part of the ‘victim nation’ blueprint of the Ukrainian national myth, which it has fur-
ther solidified. The technological and environmental consequences of the disaster, and hence 
also its economic costs, will persist for centuries, while the social consequences will dissipate 
as the affected generation passes away. In any case, Chornobyl will remain an important part 
of the life of the Ukrainian state and society. 
The Chornobyl disaster and its direct  
consequences
On 26 April 1986, a chemical explosion occurred 
in reactor number 4 of the Chornobyl Nuclear 
Power Plant, triggering the worst disaster in the 
history of nuclear energy and one of the worst 
manmade disasters in human history1. The re-
asons for the incident included irresponsible ac-
tions taken by the plant operators and the tech-
nological methods employed at the RBMK-type 
reactor which made such an explosion possible. 
1 The collapse of the Banqiao dam in China in 1975 was 
the worst disaster of this kind; it claimed 171,000 lives 
and made around 11 million people homeless.
As a result of the explosion and the ten-day fire 
that followed, heavy radioactive contamination 
occurred in an area covering around 150,000 
km2 in the Soviet Union (54,000 km2 in Ukra-
ine), while light and temporary contamination 
affected nearly the entire globe. Two people 
were killed directly in the incident, 134 became 
seriously ill with acute radiation syndrome in 
the course of the rescue operation (of a total 
of around 200,000 involved), and 28 of them 
died within weeks. Within several days of the 
disaster, around 120,000 people were re-settled 
from the contaminated zone (including 91,000 
in Ukraine), and by 2000, another 230,000 had 
been resettled (including 72,000 in Ukraine); 
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the numbers of people resettled were relatively 
low because the contamination affected areas 
that were not densely populated. 
In 1986 a protective sarcophagus was erected 
over reactor number 4 in order to prevent any 
further emission of radioactive isotopes and al-
low constant monitoring of the situation insi-
de the ruined reactor, in which processes not 
hitherto studied by science had been taking 
place. The structure was inevitably experimen-
tal in nature, and turned out to be insufficient. 
Since 2012, the construction of a new shield 
has been underway, financed largely by EU aid. 
It is scheduled to be completed in late 2016 and 
will make it possible to gradually dismantle the 
ruins and safely dispose of the fissile material 
inside. The power plant continued operating 
for some time despite the disaster. In 1991 re-
actor number 2 was decommissioned, in 1996 
reactor number 1 was put out of operation, 
and in 2000, under strong international pressu-
re, reactor number 3, located in the direct vici-
nity of the sarcophagus, was decommissioned. 
However, that did not mean that they comple-
tely stopped functioning, only that they no lon-
ger produced electricity. The gradual removal 
of nuclear fuel from the reactors will be com-
pleted in 2016, and the job of processing the 
fuel so that it can be stored in a stable manner 
for millennia will take many more years (these 
processes cannot be accelerated because they 
depend on the physical transformations taking 
place in the fuel rods). Currently 2500 people 
are employed at the power plant, and several 
tens of thousands more work in the entire exc-
lusion zone2, which covers around 2600 km2. 
Over the thirty years that have passed since the 
disaster, the levels of contamination in most of 
the areas affected by the fallout have decre-
ased considerably as a result of the decay of 
the radioactive isotopes. Currently the impact 
of the disaster is limited to the area directly sur-
rounding the power plant and some very dif-
ficult-to-detect hotspots, i.e. places where the 
radioactive fallout was concentrated, usually 
as a result of rainfall in the days of the disa-
ster; such hotspots have also been discovered 
in locations far away from the area under con-
stant monitoring. In most parts of the exclusion 
zone, including the city of Chornobyl itself, the 
level of radiation measured in 2008 was marke-
dly lower than in central Warsaw3. Since 2002 
it has been possible to take part in organised 
trips to the exclusion zone, including the power 
plant itself, and a hotel has been operating in 
Chornobyl for several years. 
The causes and consequences of the Chornobyl 
disaster are still the subject of disputes closely 
related to the debate on the future of nuclear 
energy. Advocates of nuclear power are prone 
to play down the negative consequences of the 
disaster, while opponents often exaggerate 
them, sometimes to absurd levels. On occasion 
journalists exacerbate the problem with their 
own incompetence; for instance every couple 
of years a report emerges claiming that a nuc-
lear explosion took place in Chornobyl, which in 
reality would not have been possible in a nucle-
ar reactor. The dispute also has a political signi-
ficance: nuclear energy is opposed not only by 
environmental movements and organisations, 
2 In Ukrainian: зона відчуження; an area with a radius 
of around 30 km surrounding the nuclear power plant 
(the zone is not determined geometrically but rather 
based on the local radiation levels; its borders have been 
changed on several occasions). 
3 Krzysztof Fornalski, Jakie jest promieniowanie w Czarnoby-
lu [What are the radiation levels in Chornobyl], http://www.
fornalski.rootspoland.com/Jakie_jest_promieniowanie_w_
Czarnobylu.pdf accessed on 18 April 2016 . The paper is 
a report on the research conducted by the author, a PhD 
candidate at the National Centre for Nuclear Research. 
While the advocates of nuclear ener-
gy are prone to play down the negative 
consequences of the Chornobyl disaster, 
its opponents tend to exaggerate them, 
sometimes to absurd levels.
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but also by big exporters of natural gas, inclu-
ding Russia and the Arab states, which curren-
tly offers the principal alternative to coal and 
nuclear energy. 
Chornobyl and Ukraine’s  
nuclear energy sector
Shortly after the disaster, the Soviet leadership 
scrapped the plans to further expand the Chor-
nobyl power plant, which was initially intended 
to become the Soviet Union’s largest nuclear 
power plant (in 1986 two new reactors were 
under construction and another five were plan-
ned), suspended the construction of the Crime-
an Nuclear Power Plant (which had been unde-
rway since 1975), as well as works on the plants 
in Kharkiv, Odessa and Chyhyryn. In 1991 the 
parliament of Ukraine suspended the expansion 
of the power plants in Zaporizhia, Khmelnitsky 
and Rivne, all of which were 80% complete. 
Two years later, work on them was resumed. 
All nuclear power plants currently in operation 
in Ukraine are WWER-type reactors, in which an 
incident like the one in Chornobyl is not possible. 
As Ukraine started co-operating with the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency, the country 
was able to modernise its nuclear safety sys-
tems, including in the older reactors. Curren-
tly two new reactors are under construction at 
the Khmelnitsky power plant (scheduled to be 
put into operation in 2018 and 2020). However, 
the progress of work has been stopped by the 
Russian reactor provider, as Ukraine broke off 
co-operation with Russia in 2014. Kyiv is now 
considering installing Czech-made reactors at 
the plant. There are plans to build several new 
reactors, and the Ukrainian leadership is consi-
dering building new nuclear power plants, al-
though in the current economic situation those 
plans are not realistic. The fact that the Ukra-
inian nuclear industry does not produce nuclear 
reactors or other necessary elements (while it 
does produce energy turbines) has been impe-
ding its development potential.
Despite the trauma of the disaster, which is also 
shared by the Ukrainian elites, and demands to 
phase out all nuclear power plants, which had 
already been raised in the final years of the So-
viet Union, Ukraine has maintained this branch 
of the energy sector, which accounted for 24% 
of its domestic electricity production in the 
early 1990s, 46% around the year 2000 and 
currently 60% (the proportion of nuclear power 
production has been expanding more rapidly 
recently because of the declining output of the 
coal power plants, due to disrupted anthracite 
supplies from the Donbas mines). The nuclear 
sector has gained much more significance as 
a result of the problems faced by Ukraine’s coal 
energy sector in connection with the war. 
Ukraine does not possess the technology ne-
eded to handle the whole cycle of nuclear fuel 
processing. It mines considerable quantities of 
uranium ore (around 800–900 tonnes of ura-
nium, mainly in Zhovti Vody, Dnipropetrovsk 
oblast), which it preliminarily enriches; it then 
sends the concentrate to Russia, the only state 
in the post-Soviet area with the capacity to pro-
duce fuel rods for reactors. 
After the cycle is completed, the spent fuel 
is again sent to Russia to be processed be-
fore it can be safely put into long-term sto-
rage; this process has been disrupted on se-
veral occasions in connection with tensions 
between Kyiv and Moscow. As of 2018, the 
processed fuel rods are to be returned to 
Ukraine for permanent storage (this refers 
to fuel that has been through the entire cyc-
le in a reactor; rods whose usage has been 
prematurely interrupted require a different 
Nuclear power plants currently provide 
around 60% of Ukraine’s electricity. Their 
importance has increased considerably in 
view of the problems experienced by the 
coal energy sector.
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approach). To this end, a nuclear storage site 
has been established at the Zaporizhia nucle-
ar power plant, and a new one is under con-
struction in the Chornobyl exclusion zone. 
Ukraine has attempted to end its dependence 
on the supplies of nuclear fuel from Russia; in 
2008 it started co-operation with the US-Japa-
nese Westinghouse concern, but the initiative 
has stumbled on serious technological difficul-
ties. US-made rods have been used on an expe-
rimental basis at the South Ukrainian Nuclear 
Power Plant for several years. In 2014 a contract 
was concluded with the company to supply 
rods to other reactors, but its implementation 
is uncertain, among other reasons because of 
opposition from Russia. Nonetheless, in Febru-
ary 2016 the first batch of the company’s rods, 
manufactured in Sweden, were delivered to the 
Zaporizhia nuclear power plant. 
The plans the Ukrainian leadership has been 
considering to build a plant to produce fuel 
rods in Ukraine are unrealistic in the present 
economic situation, and would also be oppo-
sed by the United States, which does not want 
to see more countries developing advanced 
nuclear technologies. 
The exclusion zone
A large part of the Chornobyl exclusion zone, 
which has been contaminated with uranium 
and plutonium isotopes, will never be habitable 
again. However, economic activity is possible 
there. Companies are already operating in the 
zone, processing waste of low-to-medium radio-
activity (mostly remaining waste from the 1986 
rescue operation); in 2015 around 10,000 m3 
of such waste was collected and secured, but 
its total quantity (including the waste already 
processed) is estimated at 2.5 million m3. There 
are also plans to build a plant to process highly 
radioactive waste, and three large disposal sites 
for the nuclear waste generated in Ukraine and 
the spent nuclear fuel returned from Russia; 
however, there have been problems financing 
the work4. Plans have also been developed to 
build a wind farm in the zone that would use 
the now idle energy grid built for the Chorno-
byl power plant. The plans for the disposal site 
have often been criticised in Ukraine as exa-
cerbating the risks, but they seem reasonable; 
the exclusion zone is irreversibly contaminated 
anyway, and has an extensive contamination 
monitoring network. Moreover, unlike in other 
locations, there is no problem with protecting 
the local population, and with state-of-the-art 
construction methods it is possible to ensure 
that the groundwater is 100% protected (the 
river Pripyat runs through the exclusion zone, 
and further downstream it flows into the Kyiv 
Reservoir on the river Dnieper which, contrary 
to widespread belief, is not the main source of 
drinking water for Kyiv). 
Parts of the exclusion zone and the entire, much 
larger, compulsory resettlement zone are habi-
table again and land may be safely cultivated 
there. Around 10,000 people live in the area 
(and partly also in the exclusion zone); some 
have been living there for twenty to twenty-fi-
ve years, and some had never moved. Howe-
ver, it seems to make no sense to rebuild the 
abandoned villages in a country in which the 
rural population is steadily shrinking and ever 
4 Cf. the transcript of the parliamentary hearing ‘30 years 
after Chornobyl: lessons learnt and outlook for the fu-
ture’ of 16 March 2016, http://static.rada.gov.ua/zakon/
new/par_sl?SL160316.htm last accessed on 23 March 
2016, and the interview with the head of the state Ex-
clusion Zone Management Agency, http://dazv.gov.
ua/novini-ta-media/vsi-novyny/kerivnik-chornobilsko-
ji-zoni-govoriti-pro-mozhlivist-prozhivannya-na-tsij-ter-
itoriji-mi-ne-mozhemo.html accessed on 16 April 2016. 
The Chornobyl zone offers a rare opportu-
nity to observe changes that occur in the 
natural environment once there is no more 
pressure from human development, which 
was relatively low in the area even before 
the disaster.
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more villages have become entirely depopula-
ted, even in places with much better soil qu-
ality. The areas affected by the disaster were 
among the most underdeveloped and poorest 
parts of Ukraine (also in terms of infrastructure). 
One of the Chornobyl zone’s great assets is that 
it offers a rare opportunity to observe changes 
that occur in the natural environment once the-
re is no more impact of constant human pre-
sence and activity on the environment, which 
was relatively low in the area even before the 
disaster. The changes taking place in the eco-
system of the Polesie region since 1986 have 
been closely studied, although more resources 
should be devoted to the research. In 2007 the 
area was declared a nature conservation site, 
and currently Kyiv is planning to transform 
parts of the zone into a UNESCO Biosphere Re-
serve, a move that would enable it inter alia to 
raise funds to study this natural phenomenon. 
Eco-tourism could probably also be developed 
in the area. 
Social and health impacts
The Soviet state broke up five years after the 
disaster, and Ukraine and Belarus, the two most 
severely affected republics, had to continue 
organising and financing the clean-up opera-
tion on their own (previously it had been an 
all-Union task; in the years 1986-1991 around 
US$17 billion from the Union budget was spent 
on clearing up the consequences of the disa-
ster, compared to US$6 billion from the budget 
of the Ukrainian SSR). One consequence of this 
is that is not possible today to determine what 
happened to those who took part in the rescue 
operation in Chornobyl, or even compile a full 
list of such people, and the same applies to 
a large number of people resettled at that time. 
This renders it impossible to reliably assess the 
long-term health impacts of the irradiation 
experienced at that time. 
Meanwhile the original healthcare system has 
collapsed and access to healthcare has become 
much more difficult, and the majority of people 
in Ukraine became dramatically impoverished in 
the first half of the 1990s, which also affected 
their health situation. The idea that any contact 
whatsoever with radiation must lead to disa-
strous consequences, which had been spread 
by the media and by spoken word, has reinfor-
ced the belief that anyone affected must beco-
me seriously ill, if not now then in the future. 
Soon after the disaster it turned out that it was 
in the interest of the very large group of people 
entitled to welfare benefits related to the Chor-
nobyl disaster and the subsequent clean-up ef-
fort to spread this belief. Even in Soviet times, 
the rescue workers and people recognised as 
affected by the operation were granted extra 
pension allowances and numerous welfare be-
nefits; several attempts have been made sin-
ce to cut those benefits, but have so far been 
unsuccessful. A dispute is currently underway 
about abolishing the benefits for people living 
in the so-called fourth zone (a monitored zone 
whose inhabitants were not resettled); Ukra-
inian President Petro Poroshenko has vetoed 
a new attempt at restoring this group’s special 
benefits. Because allowances started to be paid 
out while the initial decontamination operation 
was still underway, many functionaries would 
briefly come to the contaminated zone (for 
just a few hours) in order to become eligible 
for the benefits. The beneficiary lists compiled 
in 1986-1988 could never be verified. Later the 
‘Chornobylets’ status became inheritable: chil-
dren of the disaster victims are entitled to free 
school meals (these are children born twenty 
The very large group of those entitled to 
special benefits for the disaster victims 
(along with their family members) con-
stitutes an important slice of the elector-
ate, and is courted by nearly all political 
groups in Ukraine.
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or more years after the events), a 50% reduc-
tion of communal charges, etc. The Ukrainian 
government has estimated that the full cost of 
paying for the Chornobyl welfare benefits wo-
uld account for 17% of the state budget5, but 
not all of these benefits are being paid out. 
The welfare benefits granted to people re-
cognised as victims of the Chornobyl disaster 
were in line with the Soviet strategy of offe-
ring numerous and varied benefits and rights 
to reduced payments to various categories of 
citizens, with the intention of reinforcing their 
awareness that they depended on the state and 
that the state was the benefactor, especially of 
those who had done something special (from 
the state’s point of view). This motivation no 
longer applies in independent Ukraine, but the 
system of benefits remains, conserving the pe-
ople’s Soviet habit of relying on the state inste-
ad of their own efforts. This habit has transfor-
med into a syndrome of learned helplessness 
(especially among the older generation), and 
has been hindering social change. On the other 
hand, this large group of beneficiaries (along 
with their family members) constitutes an im-
portant slice of the electorate, which is cour-
ted by nearly all political groups in Ukraine. Any 
attempts at cutting their benefits are met by 
strong opposition from organisations of ‘Chor-
nobyl veterans’, which constitute a strong, well 
organised lobbying group. There are two politi-
cal parties with ‘Chornobyl’ in their names in 
5 Transcript..., op. cit.
Ukraine (which are in fact lobbying groups, as 
are several associations of the ‘Chornobyl vete-
rans’), and the programmes of nearly all signi-
ficant political parties include special measures 
for the ‘Chornobyltsy’. No politicians have had 
the courage to say publicly that some of the be-
nefits and discounts, especially those granted 
to the grandchildren of those affected thirty 
years ago, are not justified. 
According to the newest figures, there are cu-
rrently around 1.95 million people formally re-
cognised as affected by the Chornobyl disaster 
in Ukraine (4.4% of the country’s population), 
including 108,000 disabled people and 418,000 
children, and only 201,000 rescue workers. 
Over the last three years, the number of affec-
ted persons fell by 170,000, and the number of 
rescue workers by 33,0006. However, there are 
no sufficient justifications to assume that all 
the deaths in this group are attributable to the 
Chornobyl disaster. 
The long-term health consequences of the in-
cident are the subject of heated disputes. Some 
argue that the radiation released in the disaster 
has already killed tens of thousands and will kill 
hundreds of thousands more, while others cla-
im that the main effect of the disaster has been 
to give rise to an irrational ‘radiophobia’, and 
that the effects of irradiation are negligible and 
in any case unmeasurable7. 
There is a fairly widespread tendency to attri-
bute the increased incidence of rheumatic di-
seases or diabetes to radiation, even though it 
is entirely unclear whether the incidence has 
actually increased, given the absence of epi-
demiological data for the period before 1986. 
Likewise, mental disorders in children born 
years after the disaster, as well as lower birth ra-
tes, have also been blamed on the consequen-
6 Transcript..., op. cit.
7 Detailed figures on the Chornobyl victims can be 
found in Paweł Sekuła, Czarnobyl. Społeczno-gospo-
darcze, polityczne i kulturowe konsekwencje katastrofy 
jądrowej dla Ukrainy [Chornobyl. Social, economic, po-
litical and cultural consequences of the nuclear disaster 
for Ukraine], Kraków 2014, p. 79.
‘Post-Chornobyl depression’, whose caus-
es include certain actions by the govern-
ment, the people’s ‘learned helplessness 
syndrome’ and the media’s tendency to 
amplify every piece of nonsense about 
Chornobyl, has been a social disease in 
Ukraine for many years.
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ces of Chornobyl. All this is despite the fact that 
the quality of life and the health situation de-
teriorated rapidly throughout the Soviet Union 
in the final years of its existence, and especially 
in the first decade after its break-up, and that 
all the post-Communist countries subsequently 
experienced a demographic breakdown (which 
in Ukraine has been blamed on Chornobyl, too). 
The only soundly documented consequences of 
exposure to ionising radiation include the radia-
tion syndrome (curable in its milder forms but 
with possible long-term effects) in the rescue 
workers, and a higher incidence of thyroid can-
cer in people who were children in 1986. 
However, the health impacts of the disaster are 
not limited to the effects of radiation. The offi-
cial propaganda which dismissed ‘radiophobia’ 
obscured another dangerous phenomenon 
which had already set in during the 1990s, 
namely ‘post-Chornobyl depression’ (including 
depression in the strict medical sense) induced 
by the government’s actions, especially its criti-
cism of ‘radiophobia’ and its attempts at bla-
ming the consequences of other, often more 
serious environmental threats on the disaster, 
and exacerbated by the learned helplessness 
syndrome mentioned before as well as by the 
media, which jumped to amplify every new pie-
ce of nonsense about Chornobyl. ‘Chornobyl 
depression’ has been a social disease in Ukraine 
for many years. 
The fact that most of the Chornobyl energy 
workers who moved to Kyiv after the disaster 
had already been pronounced unable to work 
twenty years ago, while those who remained 
at the power plant were in general healthy and 
energetic, despite being exposed to higher ra-
diation on a daily basis, may suggest that in-
deed some of the conditions experienced by 
the ‘Chornobyltsy’ may have a psychosomatic 
background8. Another piece of evidence sugge-
sting there is such a background comes from 
a 2008 study conducted among the ‘Chornoby-
ltsy’, in which as many as 30% said that they had 
lost the will to live after the disaster, and 40% 
said that they did not intend to do anything to 
improve their situation9. However, as far as the 
author is aware, no-one in Ukraine has compre-
hensively studied this phenomenon, and certain-
ly nothing is being done to counter it. 
Ukraine post-Chornobyl 
The Chornobyl disaster was a greater shock for 
the Ukrainians than it was for the people in 
other republics, partly because the power plant 
was located only around 100 km from Kyiv and 
the evacuation route from Pripyat and Chor-
nobyl ran through the city, so the evacuation 
effort could not be hidden from view. Unlike 
in Belarus and Russia, the Ukrainian elite did 
pay attention to the disaster. The fact that the 
authorities initially tried to cover it up, for in-
stance by not cancelling the 1 May festivities, 
provoked a widespread outcry, and the Soviet 
leadership’s decision to proclaim a policy of 
public transparency (glasnost) in the aftermath 
of the catastrophe contributed to the dynamic 
development of civil activities and movements, 
especially the environmental movement. 
The ‘post-Chornobyl’ movements in Ukraine 
very quickly assumed a national character: the 
Ukrainian national flag, banned in Soviet times, 
was first publicly raised during an environmen-
tal demonstration in Kyiv on the third anniversa-
ry of the disaster. The environmental elements 
were soon overshadowed, and Chornobyl be-
came one of the symbols of the Ukrainians’ 
national fate and an argument for separating 
8 Cf. Наталья Куриленко, Ничего не знать о Чернобыле, 
Киевские ведомости, 19 April 1996.
9 http://gazeta.zn.ua/HEALTH/sindrom_vechnoy_zhertvy.html 
The Chornobyl disaster has become in-
scribed into the Ukrainian national myth 
as an event of significance comparable to 
that of the Holodomor.
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from the Soviet Union. In the first years, people 
fairly commonly distrusted the official reports 
about the causes and consequences of the di-
saster, and a theory spread that the explosion 
was a criminal act targeting the Ukrainian pe-
ople. Bizarre para-scientific views or views with 
no basis in science were also widely circulated, 
such as the story about a massive number of 
various mutations in the contaminated area, 
which were largely inspired by American po-
pular culture to which the Ukrainians gained 
access around that time. On the other hand, 
the term ‘Ukraine’s Golgotha’ was also coined, 
which put the disaster in a religious context.
The very name of Chornobyl also contributed to 
the disaster, acquiring a nearly eschatological 
status. It translates as ‘black weed’, and is a folk 
name for the absinthe wormwood. In a society 
that was just beginning to rediscover its Christian 
faith, associations with the apocalyptic worm-
wood Star (Revelations 8:11) were inevitable, 
especially since the disaster had been ‘prophe-
sied’ several years before by the distinguished 
and popular poet Lina Kostenko, who wrote: 
And the bitter star – wormwood – descends abo-
ve the river Dnieper. / Somewhere an explosion. 
Somewhere volcano. Ruin. Destruction10. 
Initially it was quite common for people to in-
terpret the Chornobyl disaster as a deliberate 
act on the part of the Soviet authorities: some 
people even considered it to have been an act 
of genocide, or would say things like: “This 
disaster was a logical consequence of all the 
misfortunes and tragedies that the Ukrainian 
nation has had to endure since 1914”11, or “the 
empire of Moscow which has treacherously laid 
a nuclear mine in the very heart of Ukraine...”12. 
Similar voices can still be heard today, altho-
ugh they are rarer now. The once widespread 
opinion, that the Chornobyl disaster split the 
history of the entire world into two epochs, 
10 Lina Kostenko, A terrifying kaleidoscope..., translated by 
Michael M. Naydan. 
11 The words of the renowned historian Stanislav Kul-
chytsky, http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/panorama-dnya/
chornobil-zhittya-do-y-pislya 
12 Українське Слово, No 19, 1996, cover story. 
‘before and after’, is also seldom heard today. 
Several tens of monuments to the Chornobyl 
victims have been erected in Ukraine (including 
five in Kyiv); most of them are monuments to 
the rescue workers who came from the places 
where the monuments are located (persons 
who participated in the rescue and deconta-
mination operation, awkwardly called ‘liquida-
tors’ in Ukrainian). Several museums to the di-
saster have been established (including one in 
the town of Pripyat itself, intended for tourists, 
and called the Museum of the Wormwood Star); 
and the principal hall of the Chornobyl museum 
in Kyiv has the character of a religious sanctu-
ary of sorts, combining Orthodox and pagan 
elements. Several icons of the Chornobyl Sa-
viour and the Mother Mary of Chornobyl have 
been painted, and numerous literary, visual and 
musical works commemorate the disaster. 
The Chornobyl disaster has become inscribed 
into the Ukrainian national myth as an event of 
significance comparable to that of the Holodo-
mor (the catastrophic famine of the years 1932-3 
which claimed more than 3 million lives); the 
two events are often mentioned side by side, 
as the Soviet regime’s crimes against the Ukra-
inian nation. The Chornobyl rescue workers 
are often referred to as ‘veterans’ and treated 
in the same way as the veterans of the war 
in Afghanistan (to whom the Ukrainians have 
also erected a large number of monuments), 
and even veterans of World War II. All this re-
inforces the Ukrainians’ self-stereotyping as 
a victim nation, a post-genocidal people be-
aring an indelible trauma of fourfold genocide 
(the Holodomor, the Soviet repression, the Ger-
man occupation and the Chornobyl disaster). 
The title of a monograph recently published in 
Kyiv, The post-Chornobyl library. Post-modern 
literature in Ukraine, may serve as a good illu-
stration of this thread in the Ukrainian national 
elite’s reflection13. 
13 Тамара Гундорова, Післячорнобильська бібліотека. 
Український літературний постмодерн.  – Київ, 
Критика, 2005 and 2013.
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Conclusion
On the one hand, the Chornobyl disaster gave 
a new dynamic to the Ukrainian anti-Soviet and 
independence movements. On the other, howe-
ver, it imposed an immense burden on the new 
state, hindering its potential for development. 
The Ukrainian budget will continue bearing the 
cost of mitigating the disaster’s consequences 
for many more years (even if admittedly the cost 
will fall). The country will also continue to strug-
gle with the equally serious social consequen-
ces, even if these are more difficult to measure. 
In a 2011 poll, up to 87% of respondents in 
Ukraine feared the negative health impacts of 
the Chornobyl disaster, and 70% were afraid 
that a new nuclear plant disaster could occur14. 
It is not clear what the answers would be to-
day, nearly two years into the war, which has 
changed priorities and social attitudes. Howe-
ver, even if the disaster is overshadowed by 
other things in the memory of the generation 
born after it occurred, this will not change the 
fact that Chornobyl has become a permanent 
element of the Ukrainian national identity; like 
other parts of it, it will continue to be discussed 
and reinterpreted, but will remain present. 
14 A study by the Kyiv-based Gorshenin Institute, Gorsh-
enin Weekly, No 14, 25 April 2011.
